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ABSTRACT 
Does board connectedness contribute to firm performance during a financial crisis? 
by 
Rajendra Prasad Gangavarapu  
November 2020 
Chair: Vikas Agarwal 
Major Academic Unit: Doctorate in Business Administration 
This study examines the relationship between board connectedness and future firm performance 
during the crisis period, and  whether performance varies with the firm's age and growth 
opportunities. This study distinguishes between the effect of various board centrality measures 
on firm performance during a crisis. We find that board connectedness does help future firm 
performance during a financial crisis. For all firms, future performance for the highest quintile of 
connected firms outperforms the lowest quintile by approximately 1% per year on average in the 
2008–09 crisis period. The impact of connectedness on firms’ future performance during the 
crisis period is more pronounced for young and high growth firms. Overall, board connectedness 
appears to effectively manage uncertainty, provide access to valuable resources, shrink the 
information gap, and help future firm performance during a financial crisis.  
 
INDEX WORDS: Centrality; Board connectedness; Financial crisis; Firm’s age; Growth; 
Uncertainty 
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I INTRODUCTION  
The board of directors has a fiduciary responsibility to protect and represent the interest of 
shareholders. Boards play an important role in providing strategic direction for companies to 
maneuver effectively during uncertain times. But the question arises: Are all boards equally 
effective in impacting firm performance? On one hand, highly connected directors can offer better 
advice and help firms make efficient decisions, including dealing with macroeconomic shocks. 
Boards that are better connected may be more proficient at obtaining novel and private information 
or expertise on regulatory changes, industry trends, and market conditions (Larcker, So, and Wang, 
2013). Managing external uncertainty can be extremely critical during an environment of 
macroeconomic stress, making the board connections even more valuable during the crisis. 
Anecdotal evidence supports this conjecture. For instance, Ford Motor Co. leveraged John 
Thornton, a longtime board member with deep connections in the banking industry and multiple 
board seats, to overcome its liquidity crisis in 2008 (Wall Street Journal. March 20, 20201).2 He 
was the chairman and board member of HSBC North America Holdings Inc (HNAH), and a 
director on the board of Intel, 21st Century FOX, China Netcom Group (Hong Kong) Ltd., 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) at that time. 3 On the other hand, some studies 
claim that board interlocks would reduce monitoring effectiveness (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) 
and propagate poor corporate practices (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby, 2009) and that firms with 
such interlocks are more likely to perform poorly compared to industry standards (Pfeffer, 1972). 
 
1 https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-boards-suffer-experience-gap-as-coronavirus-upends-business-
11584716400.  
2 In an another anecdotal evidence, Steve Miller, who served on several boards, said he tapped his connections and 
expertise in the bankruptcy and restructuring fields, acquired from his 17-year tenure as a United Airlines board 
member when he joined the board of American International Group Inc (AIG). He joined the AIG board in 2009 as it 
began a major overhaul after the financial crisis. 
3 Source: BoardEx. 
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Thus, the net economic impact of a board’s connectedness during the crisis period is ambiguous 
and is, therefore, an open empirical question. 
Previous studies have examined the theoretical and empirical net economic impact of board 
connections on future firm performance. However, the importance of relationships in times of 
uncertainty has been overlooked in the literature. This paper fills this gap by examining the 
empirical relation between a board’s connectedness (in terms of current professional relations of 
board members) and future firm performance during a financial crisis. Moreover, it examines how 
this relationship varies with a firm’s age and growth opportunities. 
Theoretically and empirically, there is an ambiguity regarding the effect of board 
connectedness on firms’ financial performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that multiple 
directorships hurt firms’ financial performance because busy and overcommitted directors are 
unable to discharge their duties effectively. In contrast, Larcker et al. (2013) show that board 
connectedness would improve the firms’ performance.  Fich and Shivdasani (2006) study only 
captures the busyness of directors. On the other hand, Larcker et al. (2013) leverage network theory 
holistically, capturing the network centrality and various dimensions of connectedness. Busyness 
captures the board interlocks, whereas connectedness captures how well the directors are 
connected in the network. 
Stronger firm performance is observed among companies with board interlocks to family 
and state-owned firms during the financial crisis (Carney, Child, & Li, 2020). Our paper 
complements the findings of Larcker et al. (2013) and Carney et al. (2020) but differs along several 
dimensions. This study differentiates the relationship between board connectedness and future firm 
performance during crisis and non-crisis periods, and how that may vary with a firm’s age and 
growth opportunities. Carney et al.’s (2020) study is about political and family connections in 
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southeast Asian countries. In contrast, our study doesn’t look at political or family connections but 
considers the professional relationships of directors in the United States. Carney et al. (2020) show 
that board interlocks to family and state-owned firms add value when the institutional framework 
is weak. Our research shows that board connectedness helps future firm performance in the United 
States, where the institutional framework is stronger relative to southeast Asian countries. 
Existing literature uses resource dependence and network theories to explain the board 
connectedness and firm performance. Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
argues that boards play a crucial role in linking the firm to the external environment to provide 
needed outside resources and guidance. Connected firms can raise debt capital at a lower cost 
(Chuluun, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal, 2014). A board provides advice and expertise in the 
formulation of a firm’s strategy and vital decisions (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). It has been 
shown that directors with better connectedness play a critical role in bridging the firm’s 
information gap and the external market. A well-connected director has better access to 
information, which helps the firm in strategic decision-making (Mizruchi, 1996), and reduces 
information asymmetry between the firm and the external market (Schoorman et al. 1981). 
Network theory provides network centrality measures that capture various dimensions of 
connectedness. These include degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality, 
introduced in Bonacich (1972) and Freeman (1977) and used in the more recent Larcker et al. 
study (2013). The measures in network theory are widely used to study informal and professional 
relations. Prior academic research studies conducted by Larcker et al. (2013),  Intintoli et al. 
(2018) used these measures to study professional board connections. Our analysis uses standard 
tools developed by network theory to explain the effectiveness of board connectedness on future 
firm performance during a financial crisis. 
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Our study contributes to the existing literature as follows. First, we assess the impact of 
board connectedness on future firm performance during a period of crisis. Second, we evaluate if 
and how the effect of board connectedness on future firm performance during a crisis period 
varies with the firm’s age and growth opportunities. Third, this study distinguishes between the 
effect of various board centrality measures on firm performance during a crisis. 
In this paper, Section II presents hypothesis development. Section III explains the dataset 
construction, the relevant variables employed, model specification, and summary statistics of the 
key variables. Section IV documents the empirical results and discussion. Section V concludes. 
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II HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We examine the relationship between board connectedness and firm future performance during 
the crisis period. This study also differentiates the impact of board connectedness on firm 
performance in a crisis vs. a normal period. 
• Research Question 1: Does board connectedness help future firm performance during a 
financial crisis? 
• Research Question 2: Is the impact of board connectedness on future firm performance 
more pronounced for younger and growth firms during a crisis? 
Board connections serve as a link to share knowledge and resources and as channels of information 
transfer. Through these links, the board members can access valuable resources, information, and 
networks to protect the firm from adversity and reduce uncertainty (Hillman, Canella, and 
Paetzold, 2000). Board connectedness enables managers to achieve an optimal “business scan” of 
the latest business practices and overall business environment (Useem, 1984). Connectedness 
helps reduce the information gaps faced by firms. Highly connected board members have close 
relations with business partners, influence the modification of the terms of contracts, and receive 
lower financing costs (Uzzi, 1999). As tension in the economic environment rises during a 
financial crisis, the value of information increases and the need for timely access to credit, thereby 
amplifying board networks’ benefits, which leads to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: During a financial crisis, corporate board connectedness positively impacts 
future firm performance. 
Young firms experienced slower growth in revenues and faced tighter financing conditions 
during the financial crisis. Firms are more likely to survive if they are larger in terms of revenues 
and assets. Young and growth firms faced tight credit constraints, and they were severely 
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affected by the financial crisis in 2008 - 2009. 4 Younger firms can have more significant 
information uncertainty with limited cash flows than older firms (Zhang, 2006). Older firms with 
a long history have more information available. Board connectedness may help to shrink the 
information gaps faced by such firms. Further, board connectedness can result in higher trade 
credit, whereas poorly connected firms are more likely to underperform during a crisis (Carney 
et al. 2020). Intuitively, the difference in future firm performance between highly and poorly 
networked firms is more significant among young and growth firms during the crisis. This leads 
to our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: During a financial crisis, the impact of board connectedness on future firm 
performance does vary with the firm’s age and growth opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
4 The Fed - How Did Young Firms Fare During the Great Recession? Evidence from the Kauffman Firm Survey 
(federalreserve.gov). 
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III DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION  
III.1 Data Sources 
The study’s data draws from multiple sources such as BoardEx, Compustat, and CRSP. The 
period of study ranges from 2000 to 2017. This research study explicitly separates the sample 
period (January 2000 to December 2017) into the normal period (2000 to 2007 and 2010 to 2017) 
and the crisis period (December 2007 to June 2009). 
BoardEx is widely used in academic studies and industry research and is known for accuracy 
and completeness. BoardEx collects data from various public sources, including regulatory filings, 
annual reports, proxy statements, company websites, press, and regulatory news wires and 
provides professional relationships among directors of private and listed firms in the United States. 
BoardEx data undergoes rigorous checks by 350+ skilled analysts, completing 547,000 staff hours 
of research a year. Larcker et al. (2013) study covers the listed and private companies with annual 
sales exceeding $1 billion using Boardmag data. BoardEx and Boardmag have similar coverage of 
the variables used for this study. Boardmag is proprietary and not available to the public. We 
excluded private companies for this study. Use of BoardEx makes it easier for others to replicate 
this study. Each director’s unique identifier is used to determine whether boards share common 
directors. We then compute the boardroom centrality on a firm-year basis. The financial 
accounting data comes from Compustat, and stock return data is from the CRSP database. We 
merge the Compustat, CRSP, and BoardEx data on a firm-year basis.  
The database contains the company board name represented by ticker, debt ratio, total assets, 
sales, alpha, book to market ratio, and return on assets. Network centrality measures (degree, 
closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector) are computed using the Python package (NetworkX). 
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The database used in this research study is sufficiently representative of the BoardEx population 
by sector, as shown in the Figure 1 below. The aggregated database has a match rate of around 
60% with the BoardEx data.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
III.2 Variable Construction 
Independent Variables: 
Following the literature, the study employs four centrality measures of network theory, 
namely degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality (Larcker et al. 2013), which are 
explained below: 
Degree captures the number of direct professional network connections between the given 
firm and other firms through shared directors.        
     𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖 =  ∑ 𝛿(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑗≠𝑖      (1) 
δ(i,j) denotes an indicator that boards i and j share at least one director. 
Closeness measures how quickly directors can access other directors in the network. It is 
defined as the inverse of the average distance. Boards with a high closeness score have the shortest 
distances from all other boards in the sample. 
𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖 =  
𝑛−1
∑ 𝑙(𝑖,𝑗)𝑗 ≠𝑖
    (2) 
 𝑙(𝑖, 𝑗) denotes the number of steps in the shortest path through which firms i and j can be connected 
by sharing directors, and n is the number of nodes. 
Betweenness centrality is a way of detecting the influence a node has over information 
flow in a graph. It represents the importance of an individual board member serving as the shortest 
information bridge with other members. Betweenness centrality is a way of detecting the influence 
a board member has over information flow in a network.    
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 𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖 =  ∑
𝑃𝑖(𝑘,𝑗)/𝑃(𝑘,𝑗)
(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)/ 2𝑗 ≠𝑖:𝑖∉{𝑘.𝑗}
      (3) 
Where n= (n-1)(n-2)/2 measures the number of pairs in each year in the sample, P(k,j) denotes the 
total number of shortest paths between firms k and j, and Pi(k,j) represents the total number of 
quickest ways through which boards k and j are connected through the board i. 
Eigenvector centrality assumes that not all individuals connected to a given person are 
equally important. This is a weighted degree measure, with the weights based on how well 
connected each direct link is. The eigenvector centrality score is proportional to the sum of the 
scores of shared directorates.           
  𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝐴 
𝑟
𝜆
     (4) 
Where λ represents the largest eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A, A is an n×n symmetric 
matrix, and n is the number of firms in the network. 
N-Score is a composite network centrality measure that denotes the average value of the 
quintile values for the four centrality indices. Higher N-Score values indicate higher board room 
centrality. They range from 1 to 5. A higher value indicates a higher degree of centrality.  
 𝑁 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 (
1
4
 {𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖)  +  𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖)  +
                      𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝐵𝐸𝑇𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖)  +  𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖)})      (5) 
III.3 Model Specification 
We regress ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on quintiles of the five centrality measures, as well as the 
lag of ∆ROA [lag (∆ROA)], debt ratio, measured as the total book value of liabilities divided by 
the total book value of equity; total assets, 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠), measured as the natural logarithm 
of the firm's total assets; LBM, [log(1+ Book-to-Market ratio)], measured as the natural logarithm 
of 1 plus the firm's book-to-market ratio; alpha, measured as the excess return of stock over the 
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index; Sales, [log(Sales)], measured as the natural logarithm of total sales. We include industry x 
year fixed effects to absorb time-varying industry factors. The use of quintile ranks instead of 
continuous variables for different centrality measures reduces the influence of outliers.  
The regression specification we use in examining the relation between ROA and network centrality 
measure is: 
One-year ahead firm performance 
• 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 −  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +
𝛽3 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) +  𝛽4𝐿𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 + 𝛽6log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) +  𝛽7𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 −
 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑥 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝑖𝑡         (6) 
Two-year ahead firm performance 
• 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+2 −  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +
𝛽3 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) +  𝛽4𝐿𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 + 𝛽6log(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) +  𝛽7𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 −
 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑥 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝑖𝑡    (7) 
We use degree, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector, and N-Score as a proxy for board 
connectedness, capturing various dimensions of Board Connectedness in this study. 
The dependent variable, i.e. firm future financial performance, is measured as the firm’s ROA FY1 
minus ROA FY0 or ROA FY2 minus ROA FY0.  
We assess the relationship between board-connectedness and future firm performance in the case 
of all firms, young and growth firms, high growth firms, low growth firms, young firms, and old 
firms. Book-to-market ratio measures the growth of firms. If this ratio is below the median, the 
firm is considered to be high growth, while above-median is regarded as low growth. Larcker et 
al. (2013) defined age as the log of the number of prior months that the firm appears in CRSP. 
We refine their approach to determine the age of the firm. Specifically, we consider the current 
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date minus the IPO date. If the IPO date is missing, the first year available in CRSP is taken. If 
the age is below the median, we assign it to the group of young firms while above-median age 
firms are considered as old firms.  
Control variables: Following previous studies, we control for variables that may affect firms’ 
performance. Our control variables are debt ratio, measured as the total book value of liabilities 
divided by the total book value of equity; total assets, log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠), measured as the natural 
logarithm of the firm's total assets; LBM, measured as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the firm's 
book-to-market ratio; Alpha, measured as the excess return of stock over the index; and Sales, 
log(Sales), measured as the natural logarithm of total sales.  
We control for industry x year fixed effects in all estimated regressions. We include the 
lagged dependent variable as a control variable and estimate the panel regression with the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) correction. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on two-way 
(firm and year) cluster robust standard errors to account for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence in the residuals (Gow et al. 2010). 
III.4 Summary Statistics 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Panel A in Table 1 provides the sample distribution of the number of observations, mean, and 
median of network centrality measures such as degree, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector, and 
N-Score. Our sample covers 44,779 firm-year observations associated with 5,123 unique firms. 
On average, each firm in our sample is linked to 5.88 other firms by directly sharing directors. 
The median degree centrality is 5, consistently below the mean during the sample period, 
suggesting there are some firms with very high levels of degree centrality. Network centrality is 
persistent during the crisis. Board interlocks remained mostly intact during the crisis (Heemskerk 
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et al, 2016). Firms can consider hiring well-connected directors as part of their long-term 
strategy. However, hiring well-connected directors during the crisis may not be a feasible 
approach due to the time it takes to hire the director and transition into the role. 
Panel B in Table 1 provides the sample distribution of the number of observations and 
network centrality measures by industry, using two-digit GIC industry codes. The lowest N-Score 
is observed for the retail sector, whereas the highest value is observed for the materials industry. 
Connectedness can vary by the industry, demand, and supply of the director’s skills. The material 
industry is a business-to-business (B2B), whereas retail is business-to-consumer (B2C). 
Intuitively, connectedness can play an important role in B2B compared to B2C. Customers in the 
boards of B2B firms can improve a more in-depth understanding of the customer business and firm 
performance. Dass et al. (2013) observe that directors from related upstream or downstream 
industries have a positive effect on firm performance. Clayton Act prohibits board interlocks 
between competitors. The exemptions in this act may also cause variation across sectors. 
 Panel C in Table 1 presents pooled descriptive statistics of firms’ characteristics and 
network centrality measures. Closeness and betweenness have significant skewness, indicating 
that certain firms can quickly access the boardroom network in a shorter path than others.  
Panel D in Table 1 presents the firm characteristics across quintiles of N-Score, which is 
the composite centrality measure. We find that high-centrality firms tend to have a lower book-to-
market ratio, younger in age, higher ROA, and sales. Since these differences in firm characteristics 
can potentially help explain the differences in future performance between high- and low-centrality 
firms, we include controls for these characteristics in our multivariate analyses later on.  
Panel E in Table 1 presents the correlation matrix among the independent and control 
variables in the study. The degree measure of centrality is moderately correlated with betweenness 
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(0.671) and eigenvector (0.663). Therefore, to avoid multicollinearity issues, we estimate separate 
regressions for each centrality measure. 
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IV DISCUSSION 
Prior research examined the relation between board connectedness and future firm 
performance. Board connectedness negatively impacts monitoring effectiveness (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006). Subsequent research demonstrated that firms with well-connected boards have 
higher returns (Larcker et al. 2013). Our paper complements the findings of Larcker et al. (2013) 
and Carney et al. (2020) by focusing on how the relation between board connectedness and future 
firm performance during the crisis and the non-crisis periods, and how this relation may vary with 
firms’ age and growth opportunities. 
We regress the change in ROA on board connectedness and firms’ characteristics to test 
the relation between board connectedness and future firm performance through the economic cycle 
for the entire study period from 2000 to 2017. Then we run the sub-sample regression for young 
& growth, young, old, high growth, and low growth firms during the normal period (2000 to 2007, 
2010 to 2017) and the crisis period (2008 to 2009). N-Score is a composite network measure, 
which takes the equal-weighted average quintile rank in each of the four centrality measures 
(degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector). We will be focusing on the N-Score in the 
discussion. 
Table 2 presents the relationship between board centrality measures and future firm 
performance for the entire sample period. We find that board connectedness has a positive 
relationship with future firm performance, and results are statistically significant at 1% for only 
change in two-year ahead ROA. Intuitively, ROA is an accounting measure. It takes time to reflect 
the impact of the board’s connectedness on ROA. Hence, the subsequent analysis uses the change 
in two-year ahead ROA as the primary measure of firm performance in our study. N-Score is 
statistically significant, supporting our hypothesis that board connectedness helps all firms. The 
coefficient on quintile (N-Score) is 0.0030, indicating that the highest quintile of connected firms 
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(N-Score) outperforms the lowest quintile of connected firms in future firm performance by 
approximately 1.2% (i.e., (5-1) × 0.0030 × 100%) per year, on an average for all firms in the entire 
sample period. These results are consistent with the findings of Larcker et al. (2013).  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Table 3 presents that board connectedness helps all firms in the normal as well as during 
the crisis period. Centrality-return relation is pervasive across time and persistent across different 
types of firms (Larcker et al. 2013). This indicates that firms in the study have rich networks, the 
shortest distance to other firms, and speedy access to crucial information, which would help firms 
in making better and quicker decisions (Harjoto & Wang, 2020). N-Score is statistically significant 
for all firms in the normal period (coefficient = 0.0030; p-value <.01) and the crisis period 
(coefficient = 0.0026; p-value <.1). The coefficient of 0.0030 on N-Score in the normal period, 
indicating that the highest (fifth) quintile of connected firms outperforms the firms in the lowest 
(first) quintile by approximately 1.2% (i.e., (5-1) × 0.0030 × 100%) per year, on average. The 
coefficient of 0.0026 on N-Score in the crisis period, indicating that the highest quintile of 
connected firms outperforms the firms in the lowest quintile by approximately 1% (i.e., (5-1) × 
0.0026 × 100%) per year, on average. Degree, closeness,  betweenness and eigenvector are 
statistically significant for all firms in the normal period (degree: coefficient = 0.0023; p-value 
<.01; closeness: coefficient = 0.0032; p-value <.01; betweenness: coefficient = 0.0017; p-value 
<.01; eigenvector: coefficient = 0.0014; p-value <.05). Degree and betweenness are significant at 
5% (degree: coefficient = 0.0033; p-value <.05; betweenness: coefficient = 0.0028; p-value <.05) 
during the crisis. Closeness and eigenvector have no statistical significance during the crisis. 
Degree represents how information can be accessed efficiently through the network whereas 
betweenness shows the influence of connectedness. Well-connected directors’ direct network 
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connections, influence over the information flow help the firms to deal with uncertainty and obtain 
financing during the crisis. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
We further assess the network centrality and future firm performance relationship for 
various types of firms during the normal and crisis periods. The idea is to determine whether the 
relationship holds during the changing economic conditions for young, high growth, low growth, 
and old firms during the normal period, the crisis period, and the entire sample period. 
Table 4 presents the results of young and high growth firms during the normal and crisis 
periods. It is observed that the N-Score is statistically significant for young and growth firms in 
the normal period (coefficient = 0.0037; p-value <.05) and crisis period (coefficient = 0.0061; p-
value <.05), indicating that board connectedness helps in both normal and crisis times. The 
coefficient of 0.0037 on N-Score in the normal period, indicating that the highest quintile of 
connected young and high growth firms outperforms the lowest quintile in future firm performance 
by approximately 1.4% (i.e., (5-1) × 0.0037 × 100%) per year, on average. The coefficient of 
0.0061 on N-Score in the crisis period, indicating that the highest quintile of connected young and 
high growth firms outperforms the lowest quintile by approximately 2.4% (i.e., (5-1) × 0.0061 × 
100%) per year, on average. Degree and betweenness are significant at 1% and 5%, respectively, 
during the crisis, representing the directors’ influence to control the network’s information flow. 
Directors with a high quintile of degree and betweenness improve the information flow and 
influence, which is valuable during the crisis for young and high growth firms. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Similar results are observed in case of young firms during the normal and crisis period 
shown in Table 5. It is observed that the N-Score is statistically significant for young firms in the 
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normal period (coefficient = 0.0030; p-value <.01) and crisis period (coefficient = 0.0037; p-value 
<.05), indicating that board connectedness helps in both normal and crisis times. The coefficient 
of 0.0030 on N-Score in the normal period, indicating that the highest quintile of connected young 
firms outperforms the lowest quintile in future firm performance by approximately 1.2% (i.e., (5-
1) × 0.0030 × 100%) per year, on average. The coefficient of 0.0037 on N-Score in the crisis 
period, indicates that the highest quintile of connected young firms outperforms the lowest quintile 
by approximately 1.4% (i.e., (5-1) × 0.0037 × 100%) per year, on average. This indicate that there 
exists a positive and stronger relation between board centrality and firm performance in case of 
young firms during adverse economic conditions (Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013).  
Table 7 presents the regression results for the overall sample period of young and growth 
firms (Panel A), young firms (Panel B), old firms (Panel C), high growth firms (Panel D), and low 
growth firms (Panel E). We observe that the N-Score is significant at 1% for all types of firms in 
Table 7.  
<Insert Table 7 here> 
Table 8 presents the regression results for the normal period. N-Score is significant and 
shows a positive relationship with future firm performance during the normal period. This 
represents that all firms benefit from board connectedness in a normal period. Panel A presents the 
regression results for the normal period of all firms. Board connectedness has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on future firms’ performance (coefficient = 0.0030; p-value <.01). 
The coefficient of 0.0030 on N-Score in the normal period for all firms, indicating that the highest 
quintile of connected firms outperforms the lowest quintile in future firm performance by 
approximately 1.2% (i.e., (5-1) × 0.0030 × 100%) per year, on average.  
<Insert Table 8 Panel A here> 
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Panel B presents the results of young and high growth firms during the normal period. It is 
observed that the N-Score is statistically significant for young and growth firms in the normal 
period (coefficient = 0.0037; p-value <.05), indicating that board connectedness helps in the 
normal times. The coefficient of 0.0037 on N-Score for young and high growth firms, indicating 
that the highest quintile of connected firms outperforms the lowest quintile by approximately 1.4% 
(i.e., (5-1) × 0.0037 × 100%) per year, on average.  
<Insert Table 8 Panel B here> 
Panel A in Table 9 presents the regression results for the crisis period. Consistent with our 
first hypothesis, board connectedness has a positive and statistically significant impact on firms’ 
future performance (coefficient = 0.0026; p-value <.1) during the financial crisis. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Carney et al. (2020) that companies with board connections to state-
owned firms and family business groups had greater crisis-period accounting performance. The 
coefficient of 0.0026 on N-Score for all firms in the crisis period, indicating that the highest 
quintile of connected firms outperforms the lowest quintile by approximately 1% (i.e., (5-1) × 
0.0026 × 100%) per year, on average. 
<Insert Table 9 Panel A here > 
Consistent with our second hypothesis, board connectedness has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the young and growth firms’ future performance (coefficient = 0.0061; p-
value <.05), as shown in Panel B (Table 9). Thus, the results suggest that board connectedness 
allows young and growth firms to better handle the financial crisis. This suggests that young and 
growth firms with high connectedness better manage information uncertainty and get timely 
information when the crisis unfolds. The coefficient of 0.0061 on N-Score for young and growth 
firms in the crisis period, indicating that the highest quintile of connected firms outperforms the 
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lowest quintile by approximately 2.4% (i.e., (5-1) × 0.0061 × 100%) per year, on average. There 
is no statistical significance observed for old and value firms during crisis. In sum, board 
connectedness matters more for young and high growth firms compared to old and value firms 
during the crisis. 
<Insert Table 9 Panel B here > 
In order to assess the impact of board connectedness on firms’ performance, our study 
leverages resource dependence theory, which explains how organizations reduce environmental 
interdependence and uncertainty (Hillman, Withers, Collins, 2009). Our results show that board 
connectedness helps future firm performance and supports the resource dependence theory, which 
emphasizes sharing the required resources, skills, knowledge, information flow and ability to 
influence the contract terms or financing by directors on multiple boards that help the firms face 
uncertainties during the crisis.   
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V CONCLUSION 
 
Board connectedness provides access to valuable resources, shrinks the information gap, 
and helps future firms’ performance during uncertain times. The resource dependence theory 
explains the boards’ role in engaging with the external environment to access critical resources 
and protect from adversity. A board can be considered a visible link to the firm’s external 
environment to effectively obtain valuable information (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). It helps to 
bring first-hand information on how other companies react to a given crisis caused by exogenous 
shocks, including the recent pandemic (COVID-19). 
We examine whether board connectedness helps future firm performance during a financial 
crisis and whether this differs with the firm’s age and growth opportunities. Our results 
demonstrate that board connectedness helps future firm performance during a financial crisis. Most 
connected firms outperform least connected firms by approximately 1% per year, on average in 
the crisis period. The impact of connectedness on future firm performance is more pronounced for 
young and high growth firms. The highest quintile of connected young and high growth firms 
outperforms the lowest quintile by approximately 2.4% per year, on average in the crisis period.  
This study makes several contributions to the corporate governance literature. First, this 
study differentiates the impact of board connectedness on firm performance in a crisis versus a 
normal period. Second, firms lacking board connectedness are more vulnerable to crisis. Third, 
this study distinguishes various centrality measures during the crisis. Degree and betweenness 
matter during a crisis, which improves future firm performance, especially for the young and 
high growth firms. 
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that well-connected firms allow for better 
access to information, capital, and other resources during a financial crisis. The economics of 
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board connectedness vary with the economic environment. Well-connected boards help firms to 
achieve better future performance than those with less connected boards during a crisis. This 
paper addresses the gap and examines the empirical relationship between board connectedness 
and future firm performance during a financial crisis. Our work can be extended to study the cost 
implications of having connected directors, the demand/supply gap, and regulatory implications. 
Future research can test if these results hold for private and nonprofit companies in the United 
States as well as for firms in other countries. 
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APPENDICES: TABLES AND FIGURES 
Figure 1: Distribution between Aggregated data versus BoardEx by Sector 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Firm Counts and Sample Averages by Year 
Panel A provides the number of firms and sample averages and medians (shown in parentheses) for each year of the 2000–2017 
sample. All centrality measures (Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, Eigenvector, and N-Score) are detailed in Section Variable 
Construction.  
  
Observations Connected Connected % 
Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector N-Score 
  Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median 
2000 2,065 726 35% 5.544 4 0.122 0.127 0.435 0.008 0.018 0.014 3.868 4 
2001 2,130 892 42% 6.155 4 0.099 0.102 0.288 0.007 0.017 0.011 3.948 4 
2002 2,234 960 43% 6.334 5 0.256 0.272 0.295 0.004 0.017 0.011 3.973 4 
2003 2,302 1,691 74% 5.965 4 0.051 0.053 0.165 0.001 0.012 0.008 3.478 4 
2004 2,472 2,123 86% 6.077 5 0.041 0.043 0.134 0.002 0.011 0.007 3.119 3 
2005 2,599 2,285 88% 6.314 5 0.02 0.02 0.124 0.002 0.011 0.007 2.151 2 
2006 2,675 2,310 86% 6.343 5 0.037 0.038 0.112 0.004 0.009 0.006 3.01 3 
2007 2,684 2,288 85% 6.192 5 0.023 0.024 0.121 0.005 0.009 0.006 2.429 2 
2008 2,638 2,157 82% 5.715 4 0.031 0.032 0.136 0.008 0.009 0.007 2.911 3 
2009 2,555 2,135 84% 5.709 4 0.032 0.033 0.137 0.005 0.009 0.006 3.007 3 
2010 2,492 2,099 84% 5.508 4 0.026 0.027 0.142 0.004 0.009 0.004 2.735 3 
2011 2,464 2,084 85% 5.584 4 0.022 0.023 0.138 0.004 0.009 0.004 2.377 2 
2012 2,468 2,098 85% 5.62 4 0.022 0.023 0.143 0.004 0.009 0.008 2.407 2 
2013 2,489 2,126 85% 5.795 5 0.025 0.026 0.136 0.005 0.01 0.008 2.721 3 
2014 2,601 2,231 86% 5.78 5 0.022 0.023 0.131 0.004 0.01 0.008 2.372 2 
2015 2,674 2,360 88% 5.856 5 0.013 0.013 0.136 0.005 0.01 0.008 2.112 2 
2016 2,637 2,295 87% 5.793 5 0.057 0.06 0.136 0.006 0.011 0.008 3.447 4 
2017 2,600 2,263 87% 5.592 4 0.025 0.026 0.133 0.002 0.011 0.009 2.905 3 
All 44,779 5,123 77% 5.874 4.5 0.039 0.026 0.149 0.004 0.01 0.007 2.943 3 
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Panel B: Firm Counts and Sample Averages by Industry 
Panel B provides the pooled sample averages by industry, where industries are grouped by two-digit GIC industry codes. 
 Observations Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector N-Score 
Energy 2,059 5.927 0.040 0.142 0.011 2.979 
Materials 2,133 7.222 0.042 0.194 0.014 3.221 
Industrials 6,539 6.653 0.040 0.168 0.012 3.032 
Consumer Discretionary 6,054 6.093 0.040 0.160 0.011 2.899 
Consumer Staples 1,815 6.680 0.042 0.205 0.012 2.989 
Health Care 6,684 5.852 0.038 0.138 0.010 2.838 
Financials 8,357 4.535 0.037 0.111 0.008 2.335 
Information Technology 8,153 5.265 0.040 0.125 0.009 2.729 
Communication Services 1,216 7.143 0.039 0.236 0.013 3.046 
Utilities 1,255 7.581 0.043 0.197 0.013 3.189 
Real Estate 434 5.201 0.037 0.114 0.009 2.673 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics 
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Panel C presents pooled descriptive statistics. Assets is the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets; Debt ratio is total book value of 
liabilities divided by the total book value of equity; LBM is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the firm's book-to-market ratio; Alpha, is 
the excess return of stock over the index; Age is the number of months from IPO date, and Sales is the natural logarithm of total sales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Firm Characteristics Across Quintiles of Centrality 
 Average STDEV P25 Median P75 Skew 
Degree 5.874 4.790 2.000 5.000 8.000 1.837 
Closeness 0.039 0.042 0.023 0.026 0.038 4.180 
Betweenness 0.149 0.332 0.000 0.004 0.135 4.952 
Eigenvector 0.010 0.013 0.002 0.007 0.015 2.716 
N-Score 2.820 1.415 2.000 3.000 4.000 0.118 
ROA 0.054 0.399 0.021 0.090 0.156 77.000 
Size 13.105 2.042 11.763 13.116 14.430 -0.006 
Assets 6.495 2.069 5.068 6.472 7.836 0.146 
Debt Ratio 0.560 0.530 0.330 0.543 0.768 70.060 
LBM 0.468 0.288 0.268 0.429 0.616 2.909 
Alpha 0.004 0.015 0.000 0.008 0.011 -1.356 
Age 8.563 6.572 3.000 8.000 13.000 0.870 
Sales 5.876 2.186 4.416 5.880 7.358 -0.242 
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Panel D presents the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics across quintiles of N-Score. 
 N-Score 
 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (high) High - Low 
ROA 0.036 0.048 0.057 0.130 0.099 0.063 
Size 12.370 13.009 13.509 14.092 14.819 2.449 
Assets 5.887 6.279 6.730 7.271 8.096 2.209 
Debt Ratio 0.542 0.531 0.544 0.573 0.600 0.057 
LBM 0.489 0.452 0.436 0.421 0.425 -0.064 
Alpha 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 -0.001 
Age 9.710 9.335 9.217 8.696 7.761 -1.949 
Sales 5.064 5.689 6.222 6.822 7.680 2.616 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel E: Correlation Matrix 
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Panel E contains the annual cross-sectional correlations of the raw network measures, SIZE, and LBM, where Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations are shown above (below) the diagonal.  
 
Quintile_ 
Degree 
Quintile_ 
Closeness 
Quintile_ 
Betweenness 
Quintile_ 
Eigenvector 
Debt 
Ratio Assets 
L.B.M
. Alpha Sales 
ROA_1_0
_delta_lag 
N-
Score 
Quintile_ 
Degree 1 0.207 0.671 0.663 0.105 0.456 -0.106 -0.054 0.511 -0.005 0.876 
Quintile_ 
Closeness 0.207 1 0.049 0.214 0.002 0.037 0.014 -0.079 0.056 -0.006 0.434 
Quintile_ 
Betweenness 0.671 0.049 1 0.372 0.083 0.329 -0.087 0.000 0.361 -0.010 0.731 
Quintile_ 
Eigenvector 0.663 0.214 0.372 1 0.046 0.305 -0.091 -0.026 0.369 -0.005 0.759 
Debt Ratio 0.105 0.002 0.083 0.046 1 0.481 0.138 0.001 0.262 0.009 0.088 
Assets 0.456 0.037 0.329 0.305 0.481 1 0.083 -0.024 0.823 0.002 0.390 
LBM -0.106 0.014 -0.087 -0.091 0.138 0.083 1 0.071 -0.009 0.003 -0.091 
Alpha -0.054 -0.079 0.000 -0.026 0.001 -0.024 0.071 1 -0.039 -0.003 -0.051 
Sales 0.511 0.056 0.361 0.369 0.262 0.823 -0.009 -0.039 1 0.003 0.445 
ROA_1_0_delt
a_lag -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 -0.005 0.009 0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.003 1 -0.011 
N-Score 0.876 0.434 0.731 0.759 0.088 0.390 -0.091 -0.051 0.445 -0.011 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Overall sample period        
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Panel A: Regression Results for All Firms 
Panel A presents the results from regressing future firm performance (ROAt+1 – ROAt0 and ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality 
measures (board connectedness) all firms for the entire sample period. Descriptions of Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, Eigenvector, 
and N-Score are detailed in Section Variable Construction. N-Score equals the average quintile rank of the four centrality measures. 
Debt ratio is the total book value of liabilities divided by the total book value of equity; Assets is the natural logarithm of the firm's total 
assets; LBM is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the firm's book-to-market ratio; Alpha is the excess return of stock over the index; and 
Sales is the natural logarithm of total sales. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROA (t+1) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+1) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+1) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+1) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+1) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0004     0.0025
***     
(0.00)     (0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0004     0.0031
***    
 (0.00)     (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0003     0.0017
***   
  (0.00)     (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    -0.0002     0.0012
**  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0005     0.0030
*** 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Debt Ratio 0.0593*** 0.0593*** 0.0592*** 0.0591*** 0.0593*** 0.0791*** 0.0794*** 0.0790*** 0.0790*** 0.0791*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Assets -0.0045*** -0.0044*** -0.0044*** -0.0043*** -0.0045*** -0.0035* -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0035* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LBM -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.0005 0.0200*** 0.0191*** 0.0195*** 0.0192*** 0.0201*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
alpha 0.3243*** 0.3229*** 0.3236*** 0.3286*** 0.3231*** 0.1588*** 0.1525*** 0.1592*** 0.1649*** 0.1557*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Lag of ROA 
(t+1) - ROA (t) 
0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sales 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0025 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0207*** -0.0214*** -0.0209*** -0.0208*** -0.0208*** -0.0421*** -0.0473*** -0.0433*** -0.0437*** -0.0427*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Year 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 34,701 34,701 34,701 34,701 34,701 30,833 30,833 30,833 30,833 30,833 
R-square 0.0211 0.0211 0.0211 0.021 0.0211 0.0244 0.0251 0.024 0.0238 0.0247 
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Table 3: All Firms 
Table 3 presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of all firms during the normal and crisis period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification section 
are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 Normal period Crisis period 
 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 
0.0023***     
0.0033*
* 
    
 
(0.00)     (0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0032***     0.0022    
 (0.00)     (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0017***     
0.0028*
* 
  
  (0.00)     (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0014**     0.0011  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0030***     0.0026* 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Intercept -
0.0409*** 
 -
0.0459*** 
-
0.0420*** 
-
0.0425*** 
-
0.0414*** 
-0.0166 
-
0.0225 
-0.0181 
-
0.0179 
-
0.0175 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry X Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 26,583 26,583 26,583 26,583 26,583 4,250 4,250 4,250 4,250 4,250 
R-square 0.0249 0.0249 0.0238 0.0237 0.0245 0.0565 0.057 0.0562 0.0567 0.0567 
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Table 4: Young and Growth Firms 
Table 4 presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of young and high growth firms during the normal and crisis period. Standard control variables specified in the model 
specification section are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 Normal period Crisis period 
 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0033**     0.0090***     
(0.00)     (0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0039***     0.0051    
 (0.00)     (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0044**     0.0073**   
  (0.00)     (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0013     0.0024  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0037**     0.0061** 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0274 -0.0328* -0.0288 -0.0284 -0.0276 -0.0676* -0.0773** -0.0681* -0.0662* -0.0672* 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,329 6,329 6,329 6,329 6,329 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 
R-square 0.139 0.1392 0.14 0.1382 0.1391 0.1601 0.1575 0.1593 0.157 0.1584 
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Table 5: Young Firms 
Table 5 presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of young firms during the normal and crisis period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification 
section are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 Normal period Crisis period 
 ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0029***     0.0053***     
(0.00)     (0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0033***     0.0040**    
 (0.00)     (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0027***     0.0034**   
  (0.00)     (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0014*     0.0022  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0030***     0.0037** 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0532*** -0.0587*** -0.0545*** -0.0553*** -0.0538*** -0.0394** -0.0488*** -0.0408** -0.0412** -0.0403** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry Year Fixed 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 13,125 13,125 13,125 13,125 13,125 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 
R-square 0.1091 0.1093 0.1092 0.1082 0.109 0.0864 0.0851 0.0852 0.0844 0.0852 
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Table 6: High Growth Firms 
Table 6 presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of high growth firms during the normal and crisis period. Standard control variables specified in the model 
specification section are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 Normal period Crisis period 
 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0020*     0.0042     
(0.00)     (0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0033***     0.0004    
 (0.00)     (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0017     0.0039   
  (0.00)     (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.001     0.0004  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0029***     0.0031 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0452** -0.0498*** -0.0459** -0.0459** -0.0457*** -0.0345 -0.0347 -0.0366 -0.0339 -0.0354 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y  Y 
Observations 13,265 13,265 13,265 13,265 13,265 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589 
R-square 0.0467 0.0475 0.0466 0.0465 0.047 0.0893 0.0901 0.0893 0.0893 0.0897 
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Table 7: Overall sample period    
Panel A: Regression Results for Young and Growth Firms 
Panel A presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of young and growth firms during the overall sample period. Standard control variables specified in the model 
specification section are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
  
ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Q_Degree 0.0041***     
(0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0041***    
 (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0045***   
  (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0015  
   (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0041*** 
    (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0522** -0.0590** -0.0540** -0.0532** -0.0528** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,419 7,419 7,419 7,419 7,419 
R-square 0.0912 0.0913 0.0918 0.0902 0.0913 
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Table 7: Overall sample period   
Panel B: Regression Results for Young Firms 
Panel B presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of young firms during the overall sample period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification section 
are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
  ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Q_Degree 0.0015***     
(0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0027***    
 (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0005   
  (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0008  
   (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0019*** 
    (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0403*** -0.0440*** -0.0415*** -0.0417*** -0.0405*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 16,172 16,172 16,172 16,172 16,172 
R-square 0.0743 0.0747 0.0742 0.0733 0.0743 
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Table 7: Overall sample period   
Panel C: Regression Results for Old Firms 
Panel C presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of old firms during the overall sample period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification section 
are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 
 
ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) 
Model 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0017*     
(0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0030***    
 (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0007   
  (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.001  
   (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0028*** 
    (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0208 -0.0245* -0.0217* -0.0219* -0.021 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 14,661 14,661 14,661 14,661 14,661 
R-square 0.0121 0.013 0.0118 0.0119 0.0126 
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Table 7: Overall sample period   
Panel D: Regression Results for High Growth Firms 
Panel D presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of high growth firms during the overall sample period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification 
section are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
   ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) 
Model  6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree  0.0022**     
 (0.00)     
Q_Closeness   0.0033***     
  (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness    0.0019*    
   (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector     0.0008   
    (0.00)  
N-Score      0.0030*** 
     (0.00) 
Intercept  -0.0484*** 0.0537*** -0.0493*** -0.0489** -0.0491*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  14,854 14,854 14,854 14,854 14,854 
R-square  0.0457 0.0463 0.0456 0.0453 0.046 
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Table 7: Overall sample period   
Panel E: Regression Results for Low Growth Firms 
Panel A presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of low growth firms during the overall sample period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification 
section are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
  ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - ROA 
(t) 
Model 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0015***     
(0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0027***    
 (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0005   
  (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0008  
   (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0019*** 
    (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0403*** -0.0440*** -0.0415*** -0.0417*** -0.0405*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 15,979 15,979 15,979 15,979 15,979 
R-square 0.1742 0.1756 0.1739 0.1739 0.1745 
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Table 8. Normal period 
Panel A: Regression Results of All Firms 
Panel A presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of all firms during the normal period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification section are used. 
The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are 
indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 
Q_Degree 0.0023***     
(0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0032
***    
 (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0017
***   
  (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0014
**  
   (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0030
*** 
    (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0409***  -0.0459*** -0.0420*** -0.0425*** -0.0414*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 26,583 26,583 26,583 26,583 26,583 
R-square 0.0249 0.0249 0.0238 0.0237 0.0245 
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Table 8. Normal period 
Panel B: Regression Results for young and growth firms 
Panel B presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of young and growth firms during the normal period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification 
section are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 High Growth Firms 
  ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 
Q_Degree 0.0033**     
(0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0039***    
 (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0044**   
  (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0013  
   (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0037** 
    (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0274 -0.0328* -0.0288 -0.0284 -0.0276 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,329 6,329 6,329 6,329 6,329 
R-square 0.139 0.1392 0.14 0.1382 0.1391 
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Panel C: Regression Results for Young vs. old firms 
Panel C presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of young vs. old firms during the normal period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification section 
are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 Young Firms Old Firms 
  
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0029***     0.0020**     
(0.00)     (0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0033***     0.0034***    
 (0.00)     (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0027***     0.0009   
  (0.00)     (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0014*     0.0015*  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0030***     0.0032*** 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0532*** -0.0587*** -0.0545*** -0.0553*** -0.0538*** -0.0243* -0.0279** -0.0253* -0.0256* -0.0244* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Year 
Fixed Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 13,125 13,125 13,125 13,125 13,125 13,458 13,458 13,458 13,458 13,458 
R-square 0.1091 0.1093 0.1092 0.1082 0.109 0.0121 0.0133 0.0118 0.012 0.0127 
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Table 8. Normal period 
Panel D: Regression Results for High vs. Low growth firms 
Panel D presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of High vs. Low growth firms during the normal period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification 
section are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 High Growth Firms Low Growth Firms 
  
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0020*     0.0015
**     
(0.00)     (0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0033
***     0.0031
***    
 (0.00)     (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0017     0.0007   
  (0.00)     (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.001     0.0011
**  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0029
***     0.0023
*** 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0452** -0.0498*** -0.0459** -0.0459** -0.0457*** -0.0437*** -0.0478*** -0.0449*** -0.0450*** -0.0437*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Year 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 13,265 13,265 13,265 13,265 13,265 13,318 13,318 13,318 13,318 13,318 
R-square 0.0467 0.0475 0.0466 0.0465 0.047 0.199 0.2008 0.1987 0.1988 0.1995 
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Table 9 Crisis period   
Panel A: Regression Results of All Firms 
Panel A presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of all firms during the crisis period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification section are used. 
The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are 
indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) ROA (t+2) - ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 
Q_Degree 0.0033**     
(0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0022    
 (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0028**   
  (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0011  
   (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0026* 
    (0.00) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0166 -0.0225 -0.0181 -0.0179 -0.0175 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,250 4,250 4,250 4,250 4,250 
R-square 0.0565 0.057 0.0562 0.0567 0.0567 
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Table 9 Crisis period ; Panel B: Regression Results for young and growth firms versus old and value firms 
Results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA on the quintiles of centrality measures of Young and growth firms versus old and value 
firms during the crisis period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification section are used. The t-statistics based on 
two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, and *** 
for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. YG represents Young & High Growth; OV represents Old & Value Firms. 
  
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 
Q_Degree_OV 0.0090***     
Q_Degree_OV 0.0015     
Q_Closeness_YG  0.0051    
Q_Closeness_OV  0.0007    
Q_Betweenness_YG   0.0073**   
Q_Betweenness_OV   0.0018   
Q_Eigenvector_YG    0.0024  
Q_Eigenvector_OV    0.0004  
N-Score_YG     0.0061** 
N-Score_OV     0.0011 
Intercept_YG -0.0676* -0.0773** -0.0681* -0.0662* -0.0672* 
Intercept_OV -0.0209 -0.0236 -0.0215 -0.0221 -0.0215 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations_YG 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 
Observations_OV 704 704 704 704 704 
R-square_YG 0.1601 0.1575 0.1593 0.157 0.1584 
R-square_OV 0.1679 0.1676 0.1683 0.1683 0.1685 
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Table 9 Crisis period 
Panel C: Regression Results for Young vs. Old firms 
Panel C presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of young vs. old firms during the crisis period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification section 
are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 Young Firms Old Firms 
  
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
ROA 
(t+2) - 
ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0053***     -0.0001     
(0.00)     (0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0040**     -0.0017    
 (0.00)     (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0034**     0.002   
  (0.00)     (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0022     -0.0016  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0037**     0.0009 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0394** -0.0488*** -0.0408** -0.0412** -0.0403** 0.0287 0.0332 0.0282 0.0298 0.0287 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 1,203 1,203 1,203 1,203 1,203 
R-square 0.0864 0.0851 0.0852 0.0844 0.0852 0.0898 0.09 0.0902 0.09 0.0898 
 
 
 58 
  
 59 
Table 9 Crisis period 
Panel D: Regression Results for High vs. Low growth firms 
Panel C presents the results from regressing firm-specific ∆ROA (ROAt+2 – ROAt0) on the quintiles of centrality measures (board 
connectedness) of high vs. Low growth firms during the crisis period. Standard control variables specified in the model specification 
section are used. The t-statistics based on two-way (firm and year) cluster robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of 
significance are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Q represents quintile. 
 High Growth Firms Low Growth Firms 
  
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
ROA (t+2) 
- ROA (t) 
Model ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Q_Degree 0.0042     0.0012     
(0.00)     (0.00)     
Q_Closeness  0.0004     0.0013    
 (0.00)     (0.00)    
Q_Betweenness   0.0039     0.0008   
  (0.00)     (0.00)   
Q_Eigenvector    0.0004     0.0003  
   (0.00)     (0.00)  
N-Score     0.0031     0.0007 
    (0.00)     (0.00) 
Intercept -0.0345 -0.0347 -0.0366 -0.0339 -0.0354 -0.0183 -0.0214 -0.019 -0.019 -0.0187 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,589 1,589 1,589  1,589 2,661 2,661 2,661 2,661 2,661 
R-square 0.0893 0.0901 0.0893  0.0897 0.1359 0.1359 0.1357 0.1355 0.1356 
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